A belated translation from last Thursday’s Southern Weekly:
Why must Shanxi send water to Beijing?
Southern Weekly
Qiu Feng, November 8, 2007The deteriorating ecology of Shanxi and Hebei provinces, especially Shanxi, is famous around country. And a major cause of this deterioration is a lack of water. But these areas that are so short of water still have to provide water for others. Xinhua reports that from the beginning of October, Shanxi and Hebei provinces transported 4.5 million cubic meters of water to Beijing. Shanxi supplied 2.5 million cubic meters of this. Shanxi says that from 2003 to 2006, it sent water to Beijing four times. The total amount was 200 million cubic meters.
The only reason this place that lacks water has to export its precious water resources is that the destination is the capital. To this, Mr. Yan Lieshan asks: why must Beijing be the capital and why must it be so vast. Actually, under the current framework of government relations it doesn’t matter where the capital is located, the result will be the same. Wherever the capital is established, that place will inevitably become vast and exhaust its own resources. All other cities will have to serve it, and the greatest sacrifice will be made by the areas that surround it.
People were aware of this in ancient times. The Zhou and Qin dynasties were two totally different regimes. The Zhou was a scattered feudal system. Relations between the king and the princes; and between princes and ministers were defined by “rites.” By and large, it was a contractual relationship in which each enjoyed autonomous power. So the two capitals of Zhou - Zongzhou and Chengzhou - were no more than two cities among many. There was nothing particularly great about them. On the contrary, later, people were more familiar with cities like Linzi and Handan.
The system of prefectures and counties established by Qin concentrated the people’s resources in the hands of the state, and local governments became agencies of the central government. Between the state and the people, and between governments, there was a clearly defined hierarchy with the higher levels dominating the lower. The capital was seen as the trunk and the roots, the rest of the country was seen as branches, twigs and leaves. Successive dynasties adopted a policy of “solid roots, weak branches” to manage state affairs, drawing in people, wealth and materials from all over the country to build a powerful, prosperous and beautiful capital. Thus, Chang’an and Beijing became great cities that outstripped all others.
Today, there is probably no one who considers strong roots and weak branches from a military strategy angle, but the prefectures and counties system continues to dominate the basic structure of city and regional development. Many experts are now calling for the abolishment of prefecture-level cities and putting counties under the direct control of the province. The reason is that prefecture-level cities are unrestrained in using their power to draw the resources of the counties under their control. They build huge towers, squares and streets in the city where they are based, to a stream of complaints from the counties.
But the county governments use the same tactics, doing everything they can to draw the resources of the townships to the point of controlling township finances, and they concentrate all resources into the county town where the government is based. The county towns develop rapidly and seem like cities, while some townships that already had few people and little industry have no way of providing their residents with the public goods they need. They remain like villages because the county town has forcibly taken their resources.
Thus, in the development of China’s regions and cities, a deeply unequal pattern has emerged: the scale of a city is decided by the amount of power that is located there. On a national scale, everything from natural resources to cultural, economic and human resources, is driven by the mysterious force of administrative power towards the capital. At the provincial level, resources are concentrated in the provincial capital. A county’s resources are concentrated in the county town. This sharply hierarchical system has created a capital and cities that are like citadels. Within the walls of the citadel there is prosperity; outside those walls is poverty.
This phenomenon is never-ending in China. Every institution that practices a form of prefecture and county system, dividing governments into higher and lower levels with one dominating the other and with the stronger administrative power distributing resources, will inevitably drive an abnormal amount of resources to the center of power. The central power will inevitably be the economic, cultural and transport center. The capital will inevitably be a giant, while provincial capitals and county towns will of course be mini-giants compared to their own local “rural areas.” The French thinker Alexis de Tocqueville observed that there was only one city in France: the colossal and unrivaled Paris.
In this kind of structural relationship between governments, it is inevitable that some excuse will be found to mobilize poor regions to subsidize prosperous ones. So although Beijing obviously has more plentiful water resources than Shanxi, whatever the capital needs the provinces must give, whether they have a surplus or a shortage. The provincial capitals, cities and county towns follow suit.
There is a common myth that a power can distribute resources to achieve balanced development. But there is a precondition for this: there must be limits imposed on power, otherwise that power will inevitably distribute resources according to status.
Update Dai Qing has a very pertinent essay, “Thirsty Dragon at the Olympics,” in the upcoming edition of The New York Review of Books, available online now. (h/t ‘Du Yisa’ in the comments section of Danwei’s post “Beijing’s not going anywhere.”)
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